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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. : 
MARY JEAN JOHNSON, : Case No. 20070280-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a consecutive sentences on three third degree felonies: forgery, 
possession of a forgery device, and falsely making, encoding or signing a financial 
transaction card. This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE § 78-4-103(2)(e)(2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in imposing consecutive terms where the record 
reflects that the trial court considered all required statutory factors? 
No standard of review applies. Defendant made no timely objection to the trial court's 
imposition of consecutive terms. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Any relevant constitutional provision, statute, or rule is cited in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged in two different informations with fourteen felonies 
and two misdemeanors. 
Information in district court case no. 051907686. The first information charged one 
count of falsely making, encoding or signing a financial transaction card, a third degree 
felony, and one count of theft by deception, a class B misdemeanor. R686:1-2.1 
Information in district court case no. 061904772. Nine months later defendant was 
charged in a second information with two counts of forgery, a third degree felony; one count 
of theft by deception, a third degree felony: one count of possession of a forgery device, a 
third degree felony; eight counts of possession of a forged writing, a third degree felony; and 
one count of attempted theft by deception, a class A misdemeanor. R772:l-4. 
Plea agreement. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pled guilty to three third 
degree felonies: falsely making, encoding or signing a financial transaction card, in violation 
of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-506.1 (West 2004); forgery, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 76-6-501 (West 2004); and possession of a forged writing, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §76-6-502 (West 2004). R686:102;R772:76. The remaining twelve felonies and two 
misdemeanors were dismissed. R686:105; R772:79. See also R126:2-3, 6. 
Citation to the pleadings volume in district court case no. 051907686 is indicated 
by the designation R686:[internal record numbers], and citation to the pleadings volume 
in district court case no. 061904772 is indicated by the designation R772:[internal record 
numbers]. 
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Sentence. The trial court imposed consecutive indeterminate terms of from zero-to-
five years for each of the three third degree felony convictions. R686:124-25; R772:97; see 
alsoRXW.S? 
Timely notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal. R686:126-27; 
see also R772:100. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS3 
District court case no. 051907686. In mid-September 2005, Paul Sagers dropped his 
pants off at Prestige Cleaners in Salt Lake County, where defendant was an employee. 
R686:2. Unbeknownst to Sagers, he had left his wallet in the pants. Id. Sagers5 wallet 
contained "numerous credit cards, a debit card, his driver's license, and other identifying 
documents." Id. Upon realizing his wallet was missing, Sagers contacted Prestige. Id.; see 
alsoRU3:4* 
A few weeks later, defendant's disgruntled boyfriend sent the owner of Prestige 
Cleaners, Sikander Sial, two anonymous notes stating that defendant "had been committing 
credit card fraud with credit cards belonging to Mr. Sagers." R686:2; R123:4. Sial contacted 
2A copy of the consolidated sentencing hearing transcript is attached in the 
addendum. 
3Because defendant pleaded guilty, the relevant facts are drawn from the 
Informations, defendant's statements in support of her guilty pleas, transcripts of the 
consolidated plea and sentencing hearings, and the presentence report. Copies of hearing 
transcripts are attached in the addendum. 
4A single presentence report was prepared for these cases and is contained in a 
manilla envelope that is numbered in the record at 123. 
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the Midvale Police Department with this information. R123:4. According to Sial, defendant 
"was working at the counter when [Sagers'] laundry would have come in to the business." 
Id. 
About this same time, a detective with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office 
conducted a trash cover at defendant's residence, pursuant to his investigation in an unrelated 
case, and found Sagers' wallet, credit and debit cards, driver's license, as well as other 
documents belonging to Sagers. R686:2; see also R123:4 The detective also found receipts 
for purchases made using Sagers' credit cards, as well as a credit card receipt in defendant's 
name. R686:2. 
One of the receipts found "was for a purchase at the Murray location of Lowe[']s on 
September 14, 2005 for $95.23." Id. Lowe's maintains a surveillance video which clearly 
showed defendant using Sagers' credit card to make the purchase. Id. "The . . . receipt was 
signed with the name Paul Sagers." Id. Debbie Blake, the Lowe's employee who assisted 
defendant, reported that defendant claimed that the card belonged to her mother. Id. at 3. 
When Blake said that she was going to call the credit card owner to verify the card, defendant 
"gave her several excuses for not calling about it." Id. See also R103 and R126:5. 
District court case no. 061904772. In July 2006, defendant and her daughter entered 
the Check City located at 7490 South State Street in Salt Lake County and "attempted to cash 
a check written on an account belonging to SDI of Midvale, Utah[,] in the amount of 
$1,154.61." R772:4; see also R123:5. The Check City employee became suspicious and 
contacted Katy Davis at SDI, "who stated that the check was not valid[.]" R772:5. 
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According to Davis, defendant's daughter was a former SDI employee and had "not been 
issued a check since December 2005." Id. The Check City employee stalled defendant and 
her daughter until Midvale City police officers arrived. Id.; see also R123:5. 
When the officers arrived, they detained defendant and placed her in a police vehicle 
while they investigated. R123:5, see also R772:4. Defendant escaped from the police 
vehicle, "only to be apprehended a short time later." R123:5. Both defendant and her 
daughter were arrested. Id. 
The police officers found defendant and her daughter "to be in possession of eleven 
other counterfeit checks and items used to create counterfeit checks." Id. A search of 
defendant's purse revealed identification and transaction cards in her name, and "seven Wells 
Fargo Bank checks with the name John Bayon printed on them." R772:5. Defendant's purse 
"also contained three full sheets of printed Central Bank checks" bearing her printed name 
and a receipt from another Check City location dated 17 July 2006. Id. Upon contacting the 
second Check City, defendant was identified as the person "who cashed a forged check 
written on an account belonging to SDI for the amount of $1,136.48." Id. See also R772:77 
andR126:4-5. 
Defendant's daughter's purse contained similar incriminating evidence, including 
"four Texas Commerce Bank payroll style checks with SDI of Midvale printed on them." 
R772:5. Three of these checks were made out to defendant. Id. 
The truck in which the mother and daughter had been traveling contained "jet printer 
cartridge packages, tissues soaked with various colors of ink, a portion of the packaging for 
5 
a ream of paper, q-tips with ink on them, check stubs and a sheet of two counterfeit Texas 
Commerce Bank checks." Id. 
Davis verified that all of the SDI checks found in defendant's and her daughter's 
possession were counterfeit. Id. 
A Wells Fargo Bank fraud investigator confirmed that the seven checks in John 
Bayon's name were also counterfeit. Id. The account number printed on the Bay on checks 
in fact belonged to Ransom Smith. Id. Smith did not know either defendant or her daughter 
and neither had his permission to possess his account information. Id. at 6. 
Consolidated sentencing hearing. At the consolidated sentencing hearing, defense 
counsel affirmed that he and defendant had reviewed the presentence report and that "there 
[were] no factual corrections." Rl 16:1. Counsel clarified the amount of time defendant had 
already served, "about 210 days roughly," and asked that defendant be given credit for it. 
Id. at 1-2. 
The trial court commented that defendant had "a horrible record," and defense counsel 
acknowledged: "She does." Id. at 2. The trial court further observed that defendant's record 
was "accelerating []. She starts out kind of slow back in '91 but—" Id. Defense counsel 
interjected that defendant's "life has been a pitiful rendition from childhood on." Id.5 He 
5As noted by the trial court, defendant's criminal history reaches back to 1991. 
R123:6. At the time of sentencing, she had been successfully prosecuted thirteen times 
for a variety of crimes, including two felonies: possession of a controlled substance and 
possession of a forged writing. Id. at 6-7. 
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asserted that defendant was emotionally and physically abused and had never lived in one 
place for a long period of time. Id. 
The trial court responded by observing that defendant had failed to successfully 
complete probation on two prior occasions. Id.; see also R123:8. Defense counsel 
acknowledged defendant's previous failures, but argued that they showed only that "jail [was 
not] really a curative for her ills. Incarceration does not seem to be of any positive import 
to [defendant]." Rl 16:2. The trial court replied that putting defendant in prison "for a long 
time . . . would give her a place to live." Id. The trial court further observed, however, that 
defendant's problem was not "just [that] she doesn't have a place to live. She keeps 
committing the crimes." Id. Defense counsel asserted that defendant committed crimes 
because "she doesn't have anything in order to live[.]" Id. at 3. The trial court rejected 
defense counsel's argument: "I don't buy that[,] in order to live[,] argument." Id. 
Undeterred, defense counsel asked the trial court to "follow the recommendation of 
probation and parole" for a thirty-six month probation, including that defendant serve 240 
days in jail and successfully complete a substance abuse evaluation within thirty days of her 
release. Id.; see also Rl 23:1 -2. The trial court responded that he was troubled that defendant 
had arranged to live with "an elderly sick person. [Defendant] has a pattern of taking 
advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their credit cards and uses 
them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim waiting for the next crime." Id. Defense 
counsel agreed that that was "one way of looking at it." Id. 
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The prosecutor observed that there were no treatment programs available for 
defendant, and therefore, recommended prison. Id. at 4. The prosecutor observed that 
putting defendant in prison "[wjould at least allow us a little bit of a reprieve from her 
criminal conduct." Id. Defense counsel responded that prison was not a "good solution" for 
defendant, asserting that she had "mental problems and emotional problems[.]" Id. 
After observing that defendant contributed to her daughter's criminal activity, the trial 
court imposed consecutive terms and urged defendant to take advantage of the programs 
available to her in prison. Id. at 4-5. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not object to the imposition of consecutive terms below, and never 
asserted that the trial court failed to consider the requisite statutory factors, as she now asserts 
on appeal. Nor does defendant assert that this Court should review her claim under the 
doctrines of plain error or exceptional circumstances. Thus, her unpreserved challenge to 
her consecutive sentences may not be reviewed on appeal. 
Even assuming that defendant had preserved her challenge to the trial court's 
imposition of consecutive terms, she fails to show any abuse of the trial court's broad 
sentencing discretion. The record reflects that the trial court considered all the requisite 
statutory factors in imposing the consecutive third degree felony terms. Moreover, given the 
indeterminate nature of the zero-to-five year terms, the consecutive sentences do not deprive 
the Board of Pardons and Parole of its discretion to take into account defendant's future 
conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation. In other words, the there is no minimum 
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time defendant must serve. The Board can still determine how many of the maximum fifteen 
years, if any, defendant will actually serve. Accordingly, defendant's consecutive sentences 
should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING 
CONSECUTIVE TERMS WHERE THE RECORD REFLECTS THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT CONSIDERED ALL REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS 
Defendant challenges the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms, alleging that 
"[ojther than to cite to [defendant's] criminal record, the trial court . . . failed to explain or 
address any of the statutorily required factors that led it . . . to a sentence of consecutive 
prison terms." Aplt. Br. at 13; see also id. at 15 ("[TJhere is nothing in this record to indicate 
that the trial court cconsidered[ed] the . . . history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
[defendant's] in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences." (quoting State v. 
Perez, 2002 UT App 211, f 48, 52 P.3d 451 (second and third brackets, and ellipses, in 
original)). Defendant's claims should be rejected for at least two reasons. 
First, the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms should be affirmed because 
defendant raised no objection to the consecutive terms. Her challenge is thus unpreserved 
and defendant does not assert plain error or exceptional circumstances. Defendant's 
challenge to the trial court's imposition of consecutive terms may not therefore be reviewed 
on appeal. Second, even assuming that defendant had preserved an objection to the 
consecutive terms, the record adequately reflects that the trial court considered the requisite 
criteria. And the consecutive zero-to-five year terms do not infringe on the Board of Pardons 
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and Parole's discretion to determine the actual length of defendant's incarceration. 
Defendant thus fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
A. Defendant Preserved No Challenge to the Trial Court's 
Imposition of Consecutive Terms, and Raises No Claim of 
Plain Error or Exceptional Circumstances. 
Utah courts will not consider claims raised "for the first time on appeal unless the trial 
court committed plain error or exceptional circumstances exist." State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 
4, \ 23, 128 P.3d 1171 (case citation and quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Cruz, 
2005 UT 45, If 33, 122 P.3d 543; State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, If 11, 10 P.3d 346; State v. 
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987). Utah courts require timely and specific objections 
"in order 'to bring all claimed errors to the trial court's attention to give the court an 
opportunity to correct the errors if appropriate.5" State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Utah 
App. 1993) (citation omitted). See also Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11 ('" [T]he trial court ought 
to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it'") 
(quoting State v. Eldredge, 113 P.2d 29,36 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989)). 
"Accordingly, an objection 'must at least be raised to a level of consciousness such that the 
trial [court] can consider it."' Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d at 361) 
(internal quotations omitted in original). 
Here, defendant pled guilty to three third degree felonies in exchange for twelve 
felonies and two misdemeanors being dismissed. SeeRl 26:2-3,6; R686:105; R722:79. The 
plea agreement did not address what recommendation, if any, the prosecutor might make. 
Id. The presentence report recommended thirty-six month's probation with special 
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conditions, including that defendant serve 240 days in jail and successfully complete a 
substance abuse evaluation within thirty days of her release. R123:l-2. At the sentencing 
hearing, defense counsel merely asked the trial court to "follow the recommendation of 
probation and parole." R116:3. He made no argument against consecutive terms. See 
Rl 16:1-5. When the trial court rejected the recommendation for probation—and imposed 
consecutive terms—defendant raised no objection. Rl 16:5. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that her challenge to the imposition of 
consecutive terms was preserved when defense counsel requested that the trial court follow 
the recommendation for probation in the presentence report. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (citing 
Rl 16:3). But defense counsel's request was wholly insufficient to alert the trial court to the 
alleged error now claimed on appeal—that it failed to consider all of the requisite statutory 
criteria when it imposed consecutive terms. See Aplt. Br. at 12,15. In other words, defense 
counsel's request did not raise the alleged sentencing error "cto a level of consciousness such 
that the trial [court] [could] consider it.'" Cruz, 2005 UT 45, f 33 (quoting Brown, 856 P.2d 
at 361) (internal quotations omitted in original)); State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, \ 17, 122 
P.3d 566 (holding that Weaver failed to "distinctly or specifically" articulate claimed error 
with regard to trial court's ruling on the inadmissibility of a police report and thus waived 
the claim on appeal). 
The Court's recent decision in State v. Williams, 2006 UT App 420, 147 P.3d 497, 
supports that the consecutive sentencing issue here is unpreserved. Although Williams's 
challenge to his consecutive sentences was sufficiently raised in the trial court, the Court 
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deemed the preservation issue in Williams a close question. Id. at % 28 n.6 ("We deem the 
issue sufficiently preserved, albeit marginally so"). It was a close question because 
Williams's defense counsel did not specifically object to the consecutive sentences in that 
case, but did "assertf] that he had questions about the consecutive nature of Williams's 
sentences." Id. Moreover, Williams himself complained that the sentence "was 'kind of 
harsh.'" Id. Although these broad statements were deemed sufficient to preserve the 
consecutive sentencing issue in Williams, no similar statements or objections to the 
imposition of consecutive terms are found in this record. See R116:l-5. Thus, unlike 
Williams, defendant did not preserve any challenge to the trial court's imposition of 
consecutive terms. 
In sum, because defendant did not object to the legality of the trial court's imposition 
of consecutive sentences below, see id., and because she does not assert plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal, see Aplt. Br. at 6-15, appellate review of the claimed 
sentencing error is foreclosed. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, \ 23 n.6 (declining to infer a plain error 
argument); State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995) (declining to review 
unpreserved issue because Pledger did not argue that review was justified by 'exceptional 
circumstances' or 'plain error'" (case citation omitted)). 
B. Defendant Fails to Show Any Abuse of the Trial 
Court's Broad Sentencing Discretion. 
But even if defendant had preserved her claim, she has shown no abuse of the trial 
court's broad sentencing discretion. 
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1. Utah trial courts have broad sentencing discretion. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-401(2) (West 2004), requires that when choosing between 
consecutive and concurrent sentences, "the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses, the number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of 
the defendant." A trial court may thus commit error or abuse its discretion, if it imposes 
consecutive terms without considering all the factors that are legally relevant to the 
sentencing determination. See, e.g., State v. McCovey, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990); 
State v. Montoya, 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah App. 1996). A trial court, however, need not 
explicitly note "the extent to which it considered each of the factors" relating to the specific 
factors listed above. State v. Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 10, 40 P.3d 626. 
In addition, "as a general rule [the reviewing court] upholds the trial court even if it 
failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the 
[trial] court actually made such findings." Id. at f^ 11 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). See State v. Valdovinos, 2003 UT App 432, f 28, 82 P.3d 1167 ("the burden is on 
[the defendant] to show that the trial court did not properly consider all the factors in section 
76-3-401(4)"). The presumptive protection afforded to a trial court's sentence can be 
rebutted only if "(1) an ambiguity of facts makes the assumption unreasonable, (2) a statute 
explicitly provides that written findings must be made, or (3) a prior case states that findings 
on an issue must be made." Helms, 2002 UT 12, \ 11 (internal citations omitted). None of 
these circumstances exists here. 
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Moreover, the trial court's discretion in weighing the statutory factors reflects the 
general principle that courts are accorded broad discretion in sentencing matters. It is the 
trial court, after all, that is in the most advantaged position to make the highly individualistic 
assessments required in sentencing decisions. State v. Woodland, 945 P.2d 665, 671 (Utah 
1997). In deciding the appropriateness of a particular sentence, a trial court must consider 
many intangibles, such as the defendant's "character, personality [,] and attitude, of which the 
cold record gives little inkling." State v. Sibert, 310 P.2d 388, 393 (Utah 1957). 
2. The trial court considered the requisite factors 
in imposing consecutive terms; therefore, no 
abuse of discretion exists. 
Here, contrary to defendant's claim, "the record . . . actually contains evidence to 
suggest that the trial court did consider all of the factors." Helms, 2002 UT 12, f 13. 
Defendant, therefore, fails to demonstrate any abuse of the trial court's broad sentencing 
discretion. 
The first statutorily required factors are the "gravity and circumstances of the 
offense," and the "the number of victims." § 76-3-401(2). Defendant acknowledges that 
"[t]he presentence report detailed the 'gravity and circumstances' of [her] offenses," as well 
as "her history, character[,] and rehabilitative needs." Aplt. Br. at 12 (citing R123:3). The 
trial court acknowledged receiving the presentence report at the sentencing hearing, and 
proceeded to review it with counsel. R116:l; see also id. at 2-5. While the judge did not 
expressly comment on each section of the presentence report, it is apparent that he was 
familiar with it. See, e.g., Rl 16:1 -3. In addition to the presentence report, factual summaries 
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of the felony offenses were also set forth in the statements defendant made in support of her 
guilty pleas, which the same trial court presided over. See R686:102-03 and R772:76-77. 
The record thus reasonably suggests that the trial court was well aware of the circumstances 
of the forgery crimes defendant had committed and the myriad number of victims. 
The next statutorily required factors are the criminal history and character of the 
offender. § 76-3-401(2). The trial court expressly commented on defendant's "horrible" and 
"accelerating record." Rl 16:2. Presumably reviewing the presentence report, the trial court 
observed that defendant "starts out kind of slow back in '91 but—" Id. Defense counsel 
interjected that defendant's life "has been a pitiful rendition from childhood on." Id. 
According to defense counsel, defendant's criminality was the result of alleged emotional 
and physical abuse: "[S]he's never had anything, she's lived—no place to live for long 
periods of time." Id. When the trial court observed that defendant had failed to successfully 
complete two prior probationary terms, defense counsel asserted that defendant's failures 
showed that "[incarceration does not seem to be of any positive import to [defendant]." Id. 
The trial court commented that putting defendant "in prison for a long time . . . would give 
her a place to live," but the trial court also noted that defendant's problem was "not just that 
she [didn't] have a place to live. She keeps committing the crimes." Id. The trial court 
rejected defense counsel's assertion that defendant's recidivism stemmed from the fact that 
"she doesn't have anything in order to live." Id. at 3. 
The trial court was also concerned about defendant's proposal of living with an 
elderly couple if granted probation. As observed by the trial court, "[Defendant] has a 
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pattern of taking advantage of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their 
credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's just a new victim waiting for the next 
crime." Rl 16:3; see also R123:4. Defense counsel acknowledged that was "one way of 
looking at it." Id. 
Given defendant's opportunistic criminal propensities, the trial court was reasonably 
uncomfortable with her plan to live with an elderly couple—one of whom was in ill-health 
and the other of whom was "not real excited about [defendant] living with him and his wife." 
Id.; see also Rl23:11. The trial also observed that defendant had involved her daughter in 
her criminal enterprises. R116:4; see also R123:5. These comments reflect that the trial 
court was concerned about defendant's criminal history and character before imposing the 
consecutive terms. § 76-3-401(2). 
The final statutory criteria is the "rehabilitative needs of the defendant." § 76-3-
401 (2). Contrary to defendant's claim on appeal, the trial court considered defendant's poor 
prospects for rehabilitation. As noted above, the trial court observed that defendant had 
failed to successfully complete two prior probationary terms. Rl 16:2. The trial court also 
noted that defendant had a "horrible" and "accelerating record." Id. After imposing 
consecutive terms, the trial court encouraged defendant to "take advantage of programs in 
the prison." Id. at 5. These observations and comments show that the trial court considered 
defendant's rehabilitative needs. § 76-3-401(2). 
Based on the foregoing, the trial court considered all the required statutory factors. 
Although defendant complains that the trial court failed to explain "its drastic deviation from 
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the presentence recommendation of probation," the transcript of the sentencing hearing 
reflects that the trial court was reasonably unpersuaded by that recommendation. Aplt. Br. 
at 13, Rl 16:1-5. Moreover, nothing in section 76-3-401(2) requires trial courts to accord 
each of the statutory factors equal weight. See, e.g., State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 117-119 
(Utah 1985) (recognizing that sentencing judges generally give considerable weight to 
circumstances of crime); State v. Russell, 791 P.2d 188, 192 (Utah 1990) ("One factor in 
mitigation or aggravation may weigh more than several factors on the opposite scale"); State 
v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1989) (no abuse of discretion where trial court gave 
more weight to circumstances of offense, than to defendant's desire to change and post-arrest 
good behavior); State v. Kelly, 784 P.2d 144,145 (Utah 1989) (not abuse of discretion to give 
little weight to defendant's lack of similar criminal history, cooperation with law 
enforcement, or candidacy for a recognized treatment program). 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant asserts that the trial court considered only her 
criminal record. Aplt. Br. at 13. Defendant analogizes to State v. Perez, 2002 UT App 211, 
52 P.3d 451, and asserts that like the trial court in that case, the instant trial court "failed to 
explain or address any of the statutorily required factors that led to its drastic deviation form 
the presentence recommendation of probation." Aplt. Br. at 13. This case, however, is 
distinguishable from Perez on at least two grounds. First, defendant here acknowledges that 
the presentence report addressed all the requisite criteria, see Aplt. Br. at 12, and as shown 
above, there is abundant indication in the record that the trial court reviewed the presentence 
report. See Rl 16:1; see also id. at 2-5. There is, however, little indication in Perez that the 
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presentence report addressed all the requisite factors or, if it did, that the trial court reviewed 
it prior to sentencing. Perez, 2002 UT App at fflf 44-48. Second, defense counsel here 
touched on defendant's character and emphasized her many challenges and rehabilitative 
needs at the sentencing hearing. See Rl 16:2-4. But defense counsel in Perez "said nothing 
of substance regarding any of the section 76-3-401(4) factors." Id. at 44. Thus, because the 
record in this case reflects that the trial court considered the requisite criteria, and merely 
disagreed with defendant's views thereon, defendant's reliance on Perez is unavailing. 
Finally, this case is also distinguishable from State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 
1995), State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930 (Utah 1998). Defendant cites these cases to support her 
assertion that the trial court failed to adequately consider her rehabilitative needs. Aplt. Br. 
at 10-11. Smith and Galli stand for the proposition that a trial court abuses its sentencing 
discretion when consecutive sentences deprive the Board of Pardons of its discretion to 
consider a defendant's progress toward rehabilitation. See Smith, 909 P.2d at 245, and Galli, 
967 P.2d at 938. Thus, although the Smith and Galli trial courts considered all the requisite 
criteria, the Utah Supreme Court ultimately overturned the consecutive sentences in both 
cases. 
For example, in Smith, the supreme court held that the consecutive, fifteen-year 
minimum-mandatory sentences in that case—sixty years—amounted to a de facto life term 
that deprived the Board of Pardons of its "discretion" to take into account Smith's "future 
conduct and possible progress toward rehabilitation." Smith, 909 P.2d at 244-45. Although 
the three consecutive first degree felony terms in Galli did not involve minimum-mandatory 
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terms, and did not result in an effective life term, a majority of the supreme court held that 
the consecutive sentence in that case was sufficient to deprive the Board of Pardons of its 
discretion. Galli, 967 P.2d at 938. This is because running the first degree felony terms 
consecutively in Galli meant that Galli was ostensibly facing a minimum of fifteen years to 
life. Id. 
In this case, on the other hand, the three third degree felony terms had a floor of zero 
to five years. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203(3) (West 2004). Thus, even running them 
consecutively, the floor remains at zero years. Given this circumstance, defendant's 
consecutive sentences for three indeterminate third degree felonies are simply not 
comparable to the consecutive first degree felony terms imposed in Smith and Galli. They 
certainly in no way deprive the Board of its discretion. Indeed, the Board will exercise its 
discretion to decide just how many years, "not to exceed five years," that defendant actually 
serves on each of the three third degree felony terms. § 76-3-203(3). In other words, if 
defendant shows improvement she may be released from prison at any time—there is no 
minimum number of years she must serve. If, on the other hand, defendant does not progress 
toward rehabilitation, the Board retains discretion to keep her incarcerated for up to fifteen 
years. 
In sum, the record reflects that the trial court considered all the requisite statutory 
factors. And the consecutive terms do not infringe the Board's discretion to determine the 
actual length of defendant's incarceration. Therefore, defendant fails to show any abuse of 
the trial court's broad sentencing discretion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court's imposition of three consecutive third degree felony terms should be 
affirmed. 
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5 (Transcriber's note: Speaker identification 
6 may not be accurate with audio recordings) 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 MR. WILSON: May it please the court, Scott Wilson 
9 for Mary Jean Johnson. 
10 THE COURT: May I have Ms. Johnson please? 
11 MR. WILSON: Set for sentencing, Your Honor.t May I 
12 approach, Your Honor? This is Mary Jean Johnson, Your Honor. 
13 It's set for sentencing. It's a bench warrant hearing. Ms. 
14 Johnson has been incarcerated since September 17 on these 
15 charges. Did I give the Court my copy of the pre-sentence? 
16 THE COURT: Yes, you did. 
17 MR. WILSON: [inaudible] my copy of the pre-
18 sentence report. 
19 THE COURT: You gave me back my copy. 
20 MR. WILSON: I did. Oh, here's mine. We have gone 
21 over it. There are no factual corrections. We would like to 
22 address some of the recommendations. One is that we feel 
23 that she has more than, I think they've computed three to 
24 five days of credit time served. She's been in since the 
25 September 17. 
THE COURT: She's done about seven months, about 
210 days roughly. 
MR. . . ~nat si.a be -given credit for 
Ihidt, and we d r . ny objections *o the 240 days. 
THE „;rx:ole record. 
MR. WILSON: She does. 
THE * ut r; .: .
 J JL-_ J L. __\e 
itarts out kind of slow back 1^ DL 
MR. WJ/ ?™:- ** - ^ ••*-.. -
1- i irom childhood '. , IUUJL hono: abused emotionally 
1 and physica 1!" c*hefs never had anythj-i • > 
place tu xjng periods of time, 
13 I THE COURT: ' _ e n on probation twice. She's 
, ,<hl .* L * ». i I * S o W V-» O O 1- » t ! fc / W t It W J - i l l C O • 
1'3 I MR. "WILSON: She's been on probation two ..times. . So 
v.-.f: . • shows that jail is really a curative for her 
-Is. incarcera j ; r l l • ::i o = s i i : t: s • = = ixi t: :: • I:: • = :: f a i I y p o s i 1: i v e 
import to Ms. Johnson. 
20 I THE COURT 'T ^ ^ ^it her in prison for a long time 
22 | MR. WILSON: Give her a place to live? Yeah, She 
THE COURT -t just she doesn't have a place 
25 j ku liv e. 'v-> ' -s. 
1 MR. WILSON: Well, she doesn't have anything in 
2 order to live and that's what in regard to the one, the 
3 checks and opportunities. 
4 THE COURT: I don't buy that in order to live 
5 argument. 
6 MR. WILSON: Well, some people may not have the 
7 same advantages that a lot of us do and they've become 
8 depressed, they've made bad decisions. 
9 THE COURT: And made things worse. 
10 MR. WILSON: So we would ask that the Court follow 
11 the recommendation of probation and parole, those 240 days 
12 with credit time about 210 days. She has been on mental 
13 health medications. 
14 THE COURT: It's just, it troubles me she says she 
15 wants to live with Ms. Evans down in Mapleton, this is an 
16 elderly sick person. She has a pattern of taking advantage 
17 of people whenever she has the opportunity, she steals their 
18 credit cards and uses them or she forges things. So it's 
19 just a new victim waiting for the next crime. 
20 MR. WILSON: That's one way of looking at it, Your 
21 Honor. 
22 THE COURT: Does the State have any comments? 
23 MR. HALL: Well, Your Honor, I think between her 
24 record and this current offense I think she deserves to go to 
25 prison and the prison would accomplish for the defendant, at 
least t^ ^ « i T.r^4-v. the citizens of Salt Lake County a 
reprieved from '^er criminal conduct . I would be interested 
e. -. :-x_ ..e iaea 02 an .inpatient program or something 
hat' .3 in-custcdy program, but "if M^e defendant is not 
. - - _ propriaue "chen prison 
LS clearly warranted and that's something I wc-ild be 
. ,gi a. I n: leai 1 
3 see ner get ner life turned around and get off 
drugs ~~ "v^ c:its committing cr-'m^.q. 
::ol, :i nterest as well, h.ii- there's nothing 
available for that, at.least, what are we' looking at two zero 
THE COURT: 'R: ight. 
!-!.". 1 J i" \vdui all u us a little Hit of 
a reprieve from,her criminal conduct. Unless the court has . 
jbmil 11 I II1111 II:». 1: i 1 s . 
MR. WILSON: . _ : :r.at the State will be relieved 
~f r:n"r° burder "re's been p a v ' ^ -
: „ know A * f h e r - -^ ^ JL solution to any of 
these, Your H O P / rf and I donM: know if *-Vie penitentiary is a 
:.- -n, ^ . emotional 
problems that she' s had, s o . 
THE CnnRT" • • ' • ibu* e- » 
daughter ' ; . c r i m i n a l t o o . 
MR. WILSON: . I* ' e 
4 
you're in the well, other people get in the well with you. 
THE COURT: Zero to five in the Utah State Prison 
on the 05 case; zero to five in the Utah State Prison on the 
06 case, consecutive, $350 recoupment fee, $5,000 fine plus 
surcharge. Take advantage of programs in the prison. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
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